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ABSTRACT 
 
This study showed the perceptional differences between corporate managers1 and 
stockholders2 regarding good governance. The study is conducted among 25 pairs of 
senior managers and stockholders from 25 randomly chosen corporations3 in 
Bangladesh. Different statistical tools like numeric scale, discriminant analysis, 
descriptive analysis, t-test, F-test were used for the comparative analysis. Regarding 
good governance, it is found that the corporate managers and stockholders possess 
opposing view. While managers of the studied firms find governance of their companies 
is quite well but stockholders view that it is very poor. This happened especially in terms 
of turnover, production, capital, leverage, debt service, credit policy, solvency, human 
resource, recruitment, technology, customer satisfaction, internal control, strength, 
opportunity, competition, industry position, collective bargaining agent (CBA) issues and 
economic remedies which the study found the groups differ in perception; whereas, they 
have similar view in terms of adequacy of research fund, company weaknesses and 
threats, contingency plans, presence of political influence. The managers think that the 
companies do not have enough retained earnings and these should not be distributed 
among stockholders, but the stockholders think otherwise. Managers always perceive 
that they are underpaid whereas stockholders express the opposite view. Each group 
believes that it is the other group that dominates the decision-making. While both the 
groups want to have mutual interaction but stockholders want to interact more than the 
mangers. No doubt this attitudinal differences are not good for smooth functioning of the 
corporations, what is needed is openness, more dialogues, mutual trust and 
understanding of each other. The study also noted that corporate managers' tenure is 
more with the company than a stockholder's holding of stock. It is also found that the 
managers are better educated than the stockholders. The study observed more male 
domination both in management position and stockholding of the corporations. Though 
both of the groups belong to same age level but their distribution shows that the 
stockholders entering the share market at an early age. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES 
 
The degree of closeness of manager-stockholder relationship has a significant 
influence on the governance of companies. The basic nature of executive work 
calls for an intimate relationship, but diffused and arm's length stockholders 
cannot provide good oversight or counsel and often evoke mistrust and hostility. 
To make good governance a reality, what is needed is a combination of visionary 
policies and bold actions (Haque, 2002). In addition the relationship among 
various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations, and to add value to as many organizational stockholders as possible 
is also important (Bain & Band, 1996; Monks & Minnow, 1995). Hample 
Committee Report (1998) recommend the continuation of a voluntary or self-
regulation, rather than statutory, approach to corporate governance. Cadbury and 
Greenbury reports were produced in response to widespread concern about 
particular aspect of corporate governance, namely corporate fraud and excessive 
pay, etc. (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995).  
 
Globalization of trade and commerce has also put subtle pressure on local banks 
and other financial organization to adopt corporate governance, which in turn 
help them tap international market and expand their business. To meet this 
challenge, organizations such as International Accounting Standard Committee 
(IASC), the Bank for Intentional Settlements (BIS), International Organization of 
Security Commission (IOSC), World Trade Organization (WTO), International 
Labor Organization (ILO), etc., have responded by establishing standards and 
norms related to important aspect of corporate governance.  
 
Corporate Manager-Stockholder Dilemma/Dichotomy 
 
Corporation is the place where both corporate manager and corporate stockholder 
play their roles to maximize the value of the entity. Corporate managers – unlike 
agents who execute specific tasks under the direction of their principal like 
doctors or lawyers – have a broad responsibility: a fiduciary one to act in the best 
interest of stockholders. As with other fiduciaries, their performance cannot be 
assessed according to a mechanical formula. Corporate stockholders must weigh 
the outcomes that they observe against their guesses such as what would have 
happened if managers had followed other strategies. Losses do not necessarily 
establish managerial incompetence, the alternatives might have been worse. If 
concrete performance objectives have been set, then shareholder can judge 
whether managers are playing games with the targets, e.g., if they are meeting 
cash flow goals by saving on maintenance (Bhide, 1994).  
 
The stockholders-managers relationship gives rise to a potential conflict between 
the objectives of the individual manager and the objectives of the stockholders. 
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This is known as agency problem – where the managers may place their personal 
goals and objectives above those of the company and act accordingly (Fama, 
1980). What is needed is for the concept of shareholder to be broadened to that of 
stakeholder. All those affected by corporate behavior – the general public, 
workers, consumers and the surrounding committee – ought to have some 
representation on corporate boards. The core argument that is more of a 
psychological and motivational is that people function best if they have specific 
responsibilities for which they are accountable by means which are transparent, 
viable, and respect the realities of human nature.  
 
To make truly fair evaluations, therefore, shareholders must maintain an ongoing 
dialogue with managers, which in reality, is almost impossible. Indeed, manager 
must conceal strategic information from them. When a company like Apple 
struggles to convince potential buyers that its hand held computers have to stay, 
for example, its managers cannot reveal to stockholders how disappointing the 
early sales have been. Moreover, managers who disclose more than what the 
rules require risk shareholders suit. Almost 17% of Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) surveyed by the American Stock Exchange reported that their companies 
had been sued in the past five year over voluntary disclosures they had made in 
analysts meetings, press releases or speeches (Zipser, 1994). 
 
Managers are forced to be in their own boundary. They cannot debate critical 
strategic issues in public and inside trading rules discourage private disclosures. 
Almost inevitability, their dialogues with the investment community revolve 
around quarterly earnings per share estimates, even though both sides know well 
that those figures have little long run significance. How whole-heartedly 
managers will advance the interest of anonymous shareholders is also 
questionable, and how and where should managers draw the line is important 
(Bhide, 1994). 
 
Equity Market 
 
The alienation of stockholders and managers makes public equity markets an 
unreliable source of capital. Large public corporations from all the major 
industrialized nations apparently issue common stock to raise funds only in the 
most exigent circumstances and macro economic evidence suggests that the 
quantity of funds raised by new equity issued especially by established 
companies appear to be relatively insignificant (Baskin, 1988). When public 
companies do issue equity, it is rarely to fund attractive new projects. Instead, 
they issue equity to reduce their leverage in anticipation of increased business 
risk and therefore increased probability of bankruptcy. Investors in turn regard 
stock issues with great suspicion. Investors recognize that manager have superior 
information and interpret (equity) offer announcements accordingly. The study 
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shows an average 3.1% risk adjusted drop in stock price in the two days 
surrounding an equity offer announcement (Healy & Palepu, 1989).  
 
Windows of Opportunity, Unpredictability and Unplanned Diversification 
 
The stock market does, on occasion, allow companies in fashionable industries to 
issue stock at lofty prices. But such instances usually represent episode of market 
mania or what underwriters call windows of opportunity. When the window 
closes, investors dump the stocks wholesale and don't give the category another 
chance for a long time. For example, when the market for biotechnology issues 
was hot, any company whose name included some part of the words biology, 
technology or genetics could issue stock without any products revenues or 
profits. But later, when valuations dropped back down to earth, good biotech 
companies couldn't raise capital in the public markets to fund their research and 
development (R&D) (Bhide, 1994). 
 
The market often valued favored companies believing multiples of their future 
earnings. But companies fall in and out of favor unpredictably. The market 
abruptly switches from a rosy long-term view of biotechnology to a fascination 
with multimedia companies. Understandably so without inside knowledge of 
companies' strategies and performance investors follow the crowd. Managers, in 
turn, pursue strategies to protect their companies against apathetic or fickle 
investors. Uncertain about access to capital when the company might need it, 
managers avoid paying out earnings to stockholders even when it does not. They 
reinvest profits sometimes in marginal project and outside shareholders can do 
little about the situation (Chandler, 1990). In more recent periods, the managerial 
propensity to retain earnings has led to investment in business that should be 
shrunk. Managers leave the exit to others while they continue to invest, so they 
will have a chair when the music stops (Jensen, 1993). 
 
Indifference and Hostility 
 
Indifference and hostility are also reflected in operating inefficiencies. The worst 
affront to RJR Nabiscos stockholders wasn't the perks for the CEO's dog. It was 
the instruction to the head of the Nabisco division not to generate too much profit 
in any one year so that the company could report smoothly growing earnings. 
Apparently, many managers don't try very hard for anonymous shareholders. 
Several studies have documented dramatic improvements in profit margin, cash 
flows, sales per employee, working capital, etc., after leverage buyout 
transactions that replaced diffused public stockholders with a few private 
investors. Average operating earnings increase by 42% and cash flow by 96% in 
the three years after public companies are taken private (Kaplan, 1989). Trust 
that the people with whom you deal will not only obey the law but will also 
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fulfill the fiduciary responsibilities inherent in their relationships is as essential to 
the working of the capitalists system as a sound currency and a reliable legal 
system (Stein, 1990). 
 
Social Norms and Corporate Governance 
 
Social norms provide little guidance. In Japan, the chairman of the national 
airlines is expected to resign when a pilot's error cause a plane crash. But in the 
United States (US) there is no standard for how Exxon's chairman should atone 
for the multibillion-dollar Valdez disaster. Rather, the identity and value of the 
particular individuals whose approval manager seek have much greater influence 
on their behavior. For example, CEOs who want to impress other CEOs and who 
have no contract with their shareholders will find it easier to convince them that a 
corporate jet makes them more productive. Executives know their stockholders 
and value their esteem, however, will probably be more careful stewards. 
Similarly, shareholders are more apt to ascribe poor performance to managerial 
incompetence than to bad luck if their perceptions have been shaped by colorful 
report in the press than by personal relationship with a company's manager 
(Bhide, 1994).  
 
Unfortunately, thanks to the rules, manager and shareholder in the US now 
regard each other with suspicion. CEOs complain that investors fixed their eyes 
on quarterly earnings and are ignorant of companies market, competitive position 
and strategies and therefore cannot evaluate managers. Investors see many CEOs 
as entrenched overpaid and self-serving. As Peter Lynch, the former manager of 
Fidelity's fund, half jokingly remarked, "I only buy business a fool could run, 
because sooner or later one will." Conversely, CEOs could well ask how the 
manager of the multibillion-dollar funds even remembered the names of the 
1,000 or so securities in which he invested (Bhide, 1994). In the ethical text 
compiled by Pratley (1995), Charles Handy states that:  
 
An ethical company is one that does what it believes in, and if it does it well, 
then the stockholders will be benefited. People will work better and the 
company will be respected by everyone including customers and clients. 
 
Corporate Governance in Bangladesh 
 
A developing country like Bangladesh cannot afford ill governance particularly 
in the context of its relationship with the international development community. 
Development partners recognize a growing demand for reform in governance 
worldwide. Accordingly, global corporate governance forum has been convened 
recently to provide assistance on corporate governance to developing economies 
(Hample, 1998). Such an initiative has received new urgency because of global 
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financial crisis and major corporate failures that shook major financial centers of 
the world. Performances of financial institutions, public or private, are directly 
related to economic development and social progress. Any disruption in this area 
due to weak governance can cause misery and sufferings to the people in general 
and poor in particular. As such corporate governance has become a critical issue 
closely related with proper functioning of financial regulatory bodies.  
 
Precedence of major corporate failures like Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) and a few others in Bangladesh have been attributed to 
corruption, fraud, incompetence, and abuse of power at the highest level. Every 
such failure has resulted in evolving better system, more laws and regulation, and 
their implementation within the framework of corporate governance. Currently 
the Bangladeshi government has formed a committee to reshuffle the companies' 
act 1994 by incorporating details statutory governance bindings for companies. 
In addition there has been also an initiative to make code of corporate 
governance. Also there has been a tremendous pressure on foreign associates and 
sister concern to comply with very recently introduced Surbae-Oxley Act to 
improve their governance.  
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The literatures show that corporate managers and stockholders perceptions in 
different issues often conflicting. In a developing country like Bangladesh, 
efficient and effective stock markets are the prerequisite for development and 
that ultimately will be based on smooth and follow up relationship between 
managers and stockholders. These two groups must be linked up from their 
different perceptions to govern corporation for its best prospective way. The 
broad intended objective for the study undertaken is to measure attitude of 
managers and stockholders with respect to good governance of the company. The 
basic research question would be: How different are the managers and 
stockholders view in terms of various aspects of governance, retained earnings, 
dividend payments, managers' remunerations, decision making, mutual 
interaction and good governance in general? The above-mentioned parameters 
and sub-parameters (for measuring aspects of governance mentioned in specific 
objective 2) are most often considered as a measure of good corporate 
governance in Bangladesh.  
 
The specific questions addressed in this regard are: 
 
1. Do managers and stockholders differ in their profile such as involvement 
with the company, Annual General Meeting (AGM) attended, 
educational qualification, gender and age? 
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2. Do managers and stockholders differ in various aspect of corporate 
governance such as turnover (sale), production, capital, leverage, debt 
service, credit policy, solvency, human resource, recruitment policy, 
technology used, customer satisfaction, R&D, internal control, strength, 
weakness, opportunity, threat, competition, sound plan, position in 
industry, CBA/Employees' Association, political influence, remedies for 
depression? 
 
3. Do managers and stockholders differ in adequacy, distribution and 
alternative utilization of retained earnings?  
 
4. Do managers and stockholders differ in dividend payments for 
magnitude of dividend and change in dividend policy? 
 
5. Do managers and stockholders differ in managers' remuneration for 
magnitude of remuneration and change in remuneration structure? 
 
6. Do managers and stockholders differ in corporate decision-making? 
 
7. Do managers and stockholders differ in mutual interaction among 
themselves? 
 
8. Do managers and stockholders differ in corporate governance in general?  
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
This paper is basically exploratory in nature. The main sampling units are top-
level managers and highly invested stockholders of the public limited companies 
(PLCs). The detail research parameters are enumerated below:  
 
Sampling Frame 
 
The sampling frame of this study consists of the corporate managers and 
shareholders of the studied PLCs. The sample frame has been derived from the 
list of PLCs provided by the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and Chittagong Stock 
Exchange (CSE). Only those companies have been taken which have been 
enlisted in both the aforesaid stock exchanges. There are 163 PLCs enlisted in 
both the stock exchanges at June 2002. These companies have been divided into 
10 strata such as, (1) bank, (2) engineering, (3) food and allied, (4) fuel,                
(5) textile, (6) pharmaceuticals, (7) paper and allied, (8) service, (9) insurance, 
and (10) miscellaneous.  
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Sampling Unit 
 
Sampling units are the managers and stockholders chosen in pair from different 
PLCs. Thirty PLCs were selected primarily from the various strata. Ultimately, 
25 PLCs were validated at the analytical level. Proportionate stratified random 
sampling method has been used to select these 30 from the aforesaid 10 strata. 
One paired sampling unit consists of one corporate manager and one stockholder 
of a particular PLC.  
  
Interview Procedure 
 
After preparation of the sample frame, unit and size, a sample size of 35 were 
selected for interview to meet the target of 30. Endeavor has been made to all 35 
respondents with the request for seeking an interview. Out of the 35 respondents, 
only 31 responded. Of these 31, 27 agreed to cooperate and the rest finally 
regretted. The survey started with the visit and interview of these 27 respondents. 
During the interviewing process, initiatives have been taken to approach and 
persuade the other respondents those did not respond to the first request for 
giving interviews but ended with failure. Because of inadequate and incomplete 
information, two of the interviews were dropped from the survey. After final 
scrutiny, only 25 were retained.  
 
Sources and Collection of Data 
 
The data of this study has been collected through interviews in person. The 
interviews were conducted with a structured questionnaire. Secondary sources 
including the annual audit reports, management reports and other documents of 
PLCs were also consulted. Stockholders are selected randomly from company's 
Member Register4 and contacted by the address given thereupon. In few cases of 
failure in contacting selected stockholder, next one in the resister was selected 
and contacted in the same procedure. 
 
Measurement 
 
The study undertaken is mostly involved in measuring attitude of managers and 
stockholders in good governance and other related aspects. A 7-point Likert 
scale5 has been given to each respondent. A typical numerical scale is as follows:  
 
 Strongly     1    2    3    4    5     6    7    Strongly 
 Disagree                                                Agree 
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This numerical scale utilizes bipolar qualitative adjectives in the same manner as 
the likert differential. After measuring the attitude in quantitative terms, different 
statistical tools are used to analyze and draw conclusion about them.  
 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
Manager and Stockholder Profile  
 
Involvement in company activities 
 
The study shows that on an average, a corporate manager's tenure is much more 
with the company than a stockholder's holding of stock (62.16 months vs. 28.12 
months). Majority of the managers (48%) are involved with their organizations 
for a period between 30–60 months, whereas majority of the stockholders (64%) 
keep the stocks of a company for a period of 1–30 months (Table 1). It is also 
noted that a significant (24%) portion of the managers works for a company for 
60–90 months. Similarly 36% of the stockholders keep the stocks for a period of 
30–60 months. This may be due to the fact that a manager is much more close 
and loyal to his/her job where a stockholder frequently buys and sells his/her 
stocks as and when opportunity comes.  
 
TABLE 1 
INVOLVEMENT OF MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS  
IN COMPANY ACTIVITIES 
 
Manager Stockholder Involvement 
(Month) Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
0–30 3 12 16 64 
30–60 12 48 9 36 
60–90 6 24 0 0 
90–120 4 16 0 0 
Total 25 100 25 100 
Mean 62.16 28.12 
Std. Dev. 27.98 13.11 
*Mean and standard deviations are different at 5% level of significance 
 
AGM attendance 
 
It is found that the managers' average number of attendance in the AGM is not 
significantly different (α = 0.05) than that of the stockholders (2.80 vs. 2.28), 
though numerically the managers' attendance is slightly higher than the 
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stockholders (Table 2). This can be rationalized in the sense that though the 
managers are obligated to attend the AGMs, whereas the stockholders are not, 
but both has interest in the AGMs to set the future strategies of the organizations.  
 
TABLE 2 
NUMBERS OF AGM ATTENDED BY  
MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS 
 
Manager Stockholder AGMs 
attended Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1 6 24 6 24 
2 4 16 9 36 
3 7 28 7 28 
4 6 24 3 12 
5 1 4 0 0 
6 1 4 0 0 
Total 25 100 25 100 
Mean 2.80 2.28 
Std. Dev. 1.38 0.98 
*Mean and standard deviations are different at 5% level of significance 
 
 
Education level 
 
The study shows that average corporate managers hold higher educational status 
than average stockholders. As can be seen from Table 3 that none of the 
managers are holding below a bachelor degree, whereas, 24% of the stockholders 
are in this level of education. Also it is worth noting that majority of the 
managers (56%) hold graduate degree in comparison to only 32% of the 
stockholders. But in general it is observed that majority of the stockholders 
(44%) have a undergraduate (bachelor) degree in education.  
 
TABLE 3 
EDUCATION LEVEL OF MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS 
 
Manager Stockholder 
Education level 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Up to high school 0 0 6 24 
Bachelor 11 44 11 44 
Graduate 14 56 8 32 
Total 25 100 25 100 
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Gender 
 
There is serious gender biasness both in management positions and stockholding 
of the corporations. A hundred percent male manager participation and 96% male 
stockholder participation in the study do advocate this gender inequality. It can 
be noted here that male in decision making in almost every aspect of life 
dominates Bangladeshi culture.  
 
TABLE 4 
GENDER DISCREPANCY OF MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS 
 
Manager Stockholder 
Gender 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Male 25 100 24 96 
Female 0 0 1 4 
Total 25 100 25 100 
 
 
Age 
 
The study shows that both the groups belong to same age level (35 years for 
managers vs. 33 years for stockholders) with no significant difference (α = 0.05) 
between the group's mean age. Majority of the managers (36%) fall in the age 
group of 30–40 years in comparison to majority of stockholders (44%) mean age 
between 20–30 years. It can be noted that the age distribution of managers are 
symmetrical, whereas the age distribution of stockholders are more skewed to the 
right. This indicates that the stockholders enters into the share market at an early 
age and gradually move into some other business.  
 
TABLE 5 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS 
 
Manager Stockholder Age 
(Years) Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
<20 0 0 0 0 
20–30 8 32 11 44 
30–40 9 36 8 32 
>40 8 32 6 24 
Total 25 100 25 100 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
35 
8.16 
33 
8.16 
*Mean and standard deviations are different at 5% level of significance 
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Attitudes of Managers and Stockholders  
 
In the attitude measurement the study focused on perception of managers and 
stockholders regarding the issues of governance, retained earnings, dividend 
payments, remunerations, dominance, and mutual interaction. The following 
subsections enumerated the findings regarding the managers and stockholders 
attitude in each of these areas.  
 
Governance 
 
To compare the governance related attitudinal differences between the managers 
and stockholders, the respondents were given 23 company governance related 
options to rank in a 1 (strongly disagree) – 7 (strongly agree) scale (Table 6). It 
has been found that the managers and the stockholders posses different attitude in 
18 issues out of 23 given options (Table 6). In terms of turnover, production, 
capital, leverage, debt service, credit policy, solvency, human resource, 
recruitment, technology, satisfaction, internal control, strength, opportunity, 
competition, position, CBA, and remedies the managers and stockholders attitude 
differ, i.e., towards these variables they are not agreeable with each other. For 
example, when a manager says the company's turnover is satisfactory, a 
stockholder says that it is not. But they agree for issues like R&D, weakness, 
threat, plan and political influence. For example, when a manager says that the 
company has weakness in many areas; a stockholder says that it has. 
 
TABLE 6 
ATTITUDE OF CORPORATE MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS  
REGARDING COMPANY'S GOVERNANCE 
 
Manager Stockholder Sl.  
No. Parameters/Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sig. level 
(α) 
V1 Company has satisfactory 
turnover  5.56 1.26 3.16 1.34 0 
V2 Company has satisfactory 
production  5.52 1.29 3.32 1.31 0 
V3 Company has adequate 
capital  5.48 1.23 3.56 1.08 0 
V4 Company has reasonable 
leverage 5.40 1.29 3.60 1.12 0 
V5 Company has good debt-
service capability 5.24 1.23 3.76 1.16 0 
V6 Company has standard 
credit policy 5.04 1.59 3.44 1.47 0.001 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 6. (Continued) 
 
Manager Stockholder Sl.  
No. Parameters/Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sig. level 
(α) 
V7 Company has overall 
solvency  5.56 1.26 3.40 1.26 0 
V8 Company has potential human 
resource  5.48 1.39 3.84 1.28 0 
V9 Company has sound 
recruitment policy 5.84 1.52 3.92 1.35 0 
V10 Company uses state of the       
art technology 5.04 1.49 3.40 1.32 0 
V11 Company's customers are 
satisfied 5.16 1.07 3.24 1.39 0 
V12 Company has adequate          
R&D fund 3.60 2.04 2.80 1.55 0.130
* 
V13 Company practices effective 
internal control  5.88 1.51 3.80 1.58 0 
V14 Company has strength 
potential 
4.68 1.75 3.04 1.21 0.001 
V15 Company has potential 
weakness 
4.04 1.34 3.76 1.20 0.454* 
V16 Company has prospective 
opportunity  
4.96 1.65 3.44 1.16 0.002 
V17 Company is facing threats 4.20 1.26 3.48 1.19 0.098* 
V18 Company has high 
competition 4.84 1.62 3.80 1.35 0.018 
V19 Company has plan to face 
challenges 4.00 1.68 3.20 1.26 0.067
* 
V20 Company has good position   
in the industry  4.16 1.49 3.04 1.17 0.006 
V21 CBA's demands are 
impediment to work 3.00 1.58 1.92 0.95 0.004 
V22 Company has political 
Influence 3.24 1.36 2.68 1.07 0.134
* 
V23 Company has remedies for 
economic depression 3.28 1.51 2.48 0.96 0.043 
* Not significantly different at α = 0.05  
Note: Rank in a 1 (strongly disagree) – 7 (strongly agree) scale 
 
Retained earnings and dividend payments 
 
The study shows that the managers and stockholders differ for adequacy of 
retained earnings and distribution of these retained earnings as dividend           
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(Table 7). A manager thinks that the company does not have enough retained 
earnings and these should not be distributed among stockholders, whereas a 
stockholder thinks in the opposite direction.  
 
TABLE 7 
ATTITUDE OF CORPORATE MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS  
REGARDING RETAINED EARNINGS AND DIVIDEND PAYMENTS 
 
Manager Stockholder Sl.  
No. Parameters/Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sig. level 
(α) 
1 Adequate retained 
earnings 
3.24 1.48 4.60 1.61 0.018 
2 Distribution of available 
retained earning 3.28 1.93 5.44 1.71 0 
3 More than deserved 
dividend is paid 3.48 1.45 1.84 1.07 0 
4 Change in dividend policy   
is needed 3.72 1.31 5.24 1.30 0.001 
 
But alternative uses of retained earnings other than dividend have got the similar 
type of opinion. Out of 25, 12 (48%) managers want the fund use for expansion, 
6 (24%) managers wants the fund use by modernization and 7 (28%) managers 
wants the fund use by prospective investment; similarly out of 25, 14 (56%) 
stockholders wants the fund use by expansion, 5 (20%) stockholders wants the 
fund use by modernization and 6 (24%) stockholders wants the fund use by 
prospective investment. 
 
Regarding dividend income, which is more controllable by the company than 
capital gain, the study shows that the managers and stockholders conflict with 
each other. A manager opines that stockholder is having more dividend than they 
deserve whereas a stockholder opines in the opposite direction. They also give 
different opinion about changing the dividend policy, e.g., the stockholders are in 
favor whereas the managers are against the change. This is may be because of 
manager wants consistent dividend growth where stockholder wants much more 
dividend than previously received.  
 
Remuneration 
 
Corporate manager gets remuneration for the service they have extended to the 
company. The study shows that the managers always think that they are 
underpaid (Table 8). But the stockholders express the reverse view, i.e., they are 
overpaid. Interestingly, the managers do not want to change the payment 
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structure, even if, they think they are underpaid; but stockholders want the 
change in salary structure for consistency and fair payment.  
 
TABLE 8 
ATTITUDE OF CORPORATE MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS  
REGARDING REMUNERATION 
 
Manager Stockholder Sl.  
No. Parameters/Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sig. level 
(α) 
1 Managers are overpaid 3.08 1.63 5.52 1.12 0 
2 Salary structure to be 
changed 3.64 1.89 5.04 1.77 0.010 
 
Dominance and mutual interaction 
 
So far it has been deduced that the managers conflict with stockholders' view in 
many respects. This is also true regarding dominance and mutual interaction. The 
study finds that company's undertaken decisions are believed to be dominated by 
both managers and stockholders (Table 9). For dominancy each group believes 
that it is the other group that dominates the decision-making.  
 
TABLE 9 
ATTITUDE OF CORPORATE MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS  
REGARDING DOMINANCE AND MUTUAL INTERACTION 
 
Manager Stockholder Sl.  
No. Parameters/Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sig. level 
(α) 
1 Domination of stockholders 3.00 1.53 2.24 1.27 0.062 
2 Domination of managers 4.08 1.61 5.68 1.14 0.001 
3 Mutual Interaction is 
important 4.24 2.01 5.56 1.58 0.009 
4 Should work on common 
platform 4.44 2.02 5.68 1.49 0.009 
 
To ensure good governance, mutual interaction between manager and 
stockholder seems to be useful. But our study claims that both the groups want to 
have mutual interaction but stockholders want to interact more than managers 
(Table 9). This indicates stockholders intention to work and involve more in 
corporate decision-making.  
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Overall view on good governance 
 
The overall view of managers and stockholders regarding good governance of 
their respective companies seems to be totally opposite (4.92 vs. 2.96). Manager 
strongly believes that the governance of their companies is quite good. On the 
contrary the stockholders views it is very poor. This overall view is also a 
reflection of the previous study findings regarding different governance 
parameters where in 82% cases the attitudes of managers and stockholders are 
found dissimilar. Table 10 shows a differential picture comparing the mean 
attitudes of the two groups of stakeholders of the studied corporations on 
different parameters. As can be seen from the table clear distinctions of attitudes 
of the two groups of the stakeholders regarding different parameters are clearly 
visible. 
 
TABLE 10 
COMPARISON OF ATTITUDE BETWEEN CORPORATE MANAGERS  
AND STOCKHOLDERS REGARDING DIFFERENT PARAMETERS 
 
Mean response Sl. 
No.  Parameters Manager Stockholder 
Sig. level  
(α) 
A. Governance    
1 Satisfactory turnover 5.56 3.16 0 
2 Satisfactory production 5.52 3.32 0 
3 Adequate capital 5.48 3.56 0 
4 Reasonable leverage 5.40 3.60 0 
5 Adequate debt service capability 5.24 3.76 0 
6 Standard credit policy 5.04 3.44 0.001 
7 Solvency in material purpose 5.56 3.40 0 
8 Potential human resource for 
operation 
5.48 3.84 0 
9 Sound recruitment policy 5.84 3.92 0 
10 Use of state of the art technology 5.04 3.40 0 
11 Customer satisfaction 5.16 3.24 0 
12 Adequate R&D fund 3.60 2.80 0.130* 
13 Effective internal control  5.88 3.80 0 
14 Enough strength 4.68 3.04 0.001 
15 Potential weakness 4.04 3.76 0.454* 
16 Prospective opportunity 4.96 3.44 0.002 
17 Facing threat 4.20 3.48 0.098* 
18 High competition 4.84 3.80 0.018 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 9. (Continued) 
 
Mean response 
Sl. No.  Parameters 
Manager Stockholder 
Sig. level 
(α) 
19 Plan to face challenges 4.00 3.20 0.067* 
20 Good position in the industry 4.16 3.04 0.006 
21 CBA's demands are impediment 3.00 1.92 0.004 
22 Political Influence 3.24 2.68 0.134* 
23 Remedies exist for economic 
depression 
3.28 2.48 0.043 
B.  Retained Earnings and Dividend 
Payments 
   
1 Adequate retained earnings 3.24 4.60 0.018 
2 Distribution of available retained 
earning 
3.28 5.44 0 
3 More than deserved dividend is 
paid 
3.48 1.84 0 
4 Change in dividend policy is 
needed 
3.72 5.24 0.001 
C. Remuneration    
1 Managers are overpaid 3.08 5.52 0 
2 Salary structure to be changed 3.64 5.04 0.010 
D. Dominance and Mutual Interaction    
1 Domination of stock-holders 3.00 2.24 0.062* 
2 Domination of managers 4.08 5.68 0.001 
3 Mutual interaction is important 4.24 5.56 0.009 
4 Should work on common platform 4.44 5.68 0.009 
E. Overall Governance 4.92 2.96 0 
* Not significantly different at α = 0.05 
 
Comparison of variance of attitude 
 
As already noted that the managers and stockholders mostly differ in their 
attitudes regarding different parameters of good governance in their 
organizations. To strengthen our study findings further an analysis of comparison 
of variance of attitudes are made and enumerated below. In this section we tried 
to find out whether the variances of their answers against each of the parameters 
discussed in previous sections are similar or different. In this process a F-test is 
conducted at a level of significance of 5%. Here the null and alternate hypotheses 
are:  
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Ho:  The variances are same 
 
Ha:  The variances are not same 
 
The study shows that except for two cases (CBA's demands are impediment, 
remedies exist for economic depression) the variances of the answers of the two 
groups are same at a level of significance of 5% (Table 11). In the light of above 
findings regarding good governance, it can be concluded that the differing 
attitudes observed between the managers and stockholders are quite strong and 
each group is not very dispersed in their stronghold. 
 
TABLE 11 
COMPARISON OF VARIANCE OF ATTITUDE BETWEEN CORPORATE 
MANAGERS AND STOCKHOLDERS 
 
Manager Stockholder F-Statistics 
Sl. 
No. Parameters/Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Value 
Variance 
same/ 
different at 
α = 0.05 
1 Satisfactory turnover 5.56 1.26 3.16 1.34 1.13 Same 
2 Satisfactory production 5.52 1.29 3.32 1.31 1.03 Same 
3 Adequate capital 5.48 1.23 3.56 1.08 1.29 Same 
4 Reasonable leverage 5.40 1.29 3.60 1.12 1.33 Same 
5 Adequate debt service 
capability 5.24 1.23 3.76 1.16 1.12 Same 
6 Standard credit policy 5.04 1.59 3.44 1.47 1.17 Same 
7 Solvency in material purpose 5.56 1.26 3.40 1.26 1.0 Same 
8 Potential human resource for 
operation 
5.48 1.39 3.84 1.28 1.18 Same 
9 Sound recruitment policy 5.84 1.52 3.92 1.35 1.27 Same 
10 Use of state of the art 
technology 5.04 1.49 3.40 1.32 1.27 Same 
11 Customer satisfaction 5.16 1.07 3.24 1.39 1.69 Same 
12 Adequate R&D fund 3.60 2.04 2.80 1.55 1.73 Same 
13 Effective internal control  5.88 1.51 3.80 1.58 1.09 Same 
14 Enough strength 4.68 1.75 3.04 1.21 2.09 Same 
15 Potential weakness 4.04 1.34 3.76 1.20 1.25 Same 
16 Prospective opportunity 4.96 1.65 3.44 1.16 2.20 Same 
17 Facing threat 4.20 1.26 3.48 1.19 1.12 Same 
18 High competition 4.84 1.62 3.80 1.35 1.44 Same 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 11. (Continued) 
 
Manager Stockholder F-Statistics 
Sl. 
No. Parameters/Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Value 
Variance 
same/ 
different at 
α = 0.05 
19 Plan to face challenges 4.00 1.68 3.20 1.26 1.78 Same 
20 Good position in the industry 4.16 1.49 3.04 1.17 1.62 Same 
21 CBA's demands are 
impediment 3.00 1.58 1.92 0.95 2.77 Different 
22 Political influence 3.24 1.36 2.68 1.07 1.62 Same 
23 Remedies exist for economic 
depression 3.28 1.51 2.48 0.96 2.47 Different 
24 Adequate retained earnings 3.24 1.48 4.60 1.61 1.18 Same 
25 Distribution of available 
retained earning 3.28 1.93 5.44 1.71 1.27 Same 
26 More than deserved dividend 
is paid 3.48 1.45 1.84 1.07 1.84 Same 
27 Change in dividend policy is 
needed 3.72 1.31 5.24 1.30 1.02 Same 
28 Managers are overpaid 3.08 1.63 5.52 1.12 2.12 Same 
29 Salary structure to be changed 3.64 1.89 5.04 1.77 1.14 Same 
30 Domination of stock-holders 3.00 1.53 2.24 1.27 1.45 Same 
31 Domination of managers 4.08 1.61 5.68 1.14 1.99 Same 
32 Mutual interaction is  
important 4.24 2.01 5.56 1.58 1.62 Same 
33 Should work on common 
platform 4.44 2.02 5.68 1.49 1.84 Same 
34 Governance 4.92 1.63 2.96 1.24 1.73 Same 
Note: If F-Statistics is less than critical value 2.27 (at α = 0.05 and 24o of freedom for both numerator and 
denominator), we do not reject the null hypothesis (i.e., Ho: the variances are same). 
 
Discriminant Analysis  
 
A discriminant analysis is carried out to see if the overall classification of the 
attitude of the managers and the stockholders towards good governance are same 
or not. The variables taken are the 23 parameters chosen for attitude 
measurement of corporate managers and stockholders regarding good 
governance (Table 6). Here we put type 1 group as 25 corporate managers' 
responses and type 2 groups as 25 corporate stockholders' responses that make a 
total of 50 responses. The unstandardized discriminant function is shown in 
Table 12.  
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TABLE 12 
SUMMARY OF CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION ANALYSIS 
 
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient 
V1 
V2 
V3 
V4 
V5 
V6 
V7 
V8 
+0.585 
–0.153 
+0.119 
+0.078 
–0.029 
–0.154 
+0.529 
–0.348 
V9 
V10 
V11 
V12 
V13 
V14 
V15 
V16 
+0.363 
–0.136 
+0.580 
–0.132 
–0.023 
–0.073 
+0.062 
–0.261 
V17 
V18 
V19 
V20 
V21 
V22 
V23 
+0.287 
+0.135 
–0.134 
–0.203 
+0.588 
–0.063 
+0.245 
 
Cannonical correlation coefficient = 0.85 (significance at  α = 0.05) 
Wilk's lambda = 0.277 (significance at 0.002) 
Box's M = 753.074 (significance at 0.001) 
A "+" value of the function indicates managers attitude and a "–" value of the function 
indicates shareholders attitude 
 
The test results indicate a significant (α = 0.05) discriminant function with zero 
misclassification. A high canonical correlation coefficient (0.85) indicates strong 
correlation between the dependent and independent variables. A low Wilk's 
lambda (0.277 significant at 0.002) and high Box's M (753.074 significant at 
0.001) also indicates a strong variation of the attitudes of the two groups. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of equal population covariance matrices has been 
rejected at 5% level of significance. This means corporate manager's attitude 
towards good governance (Type 1), as a whole, is different from that of 
stockholders (Type 2). 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The study focuses on different views of good governance as perceived by 
corporate managers and stockholders. To answer the research question, 25 PLCs 
were selected. From each of these companies, one manager and one stockholder 
are chosen to get their views using a structured questionnaire. The profile of the 
managers and stockholders shows that on an average, a corporate manager's 
tenure is more with the company than a stockholder's holding of that company's 
stock (62.16 months vs. 28.12 months). This may be due to the fact that a 
manager is much more attached to the job where a stockholder frequently buys 
and sells the stocks as and when opportunity comes. It is found that the 
managers' average number of attendance in the AGM is not significantly 
different (α = 0.05) than that of the stockholders (2.80 vs. 2.28), even though the 
managers are usually obligated to attend the AGMs, whereas the stockholders are 
not. This shows both the groups interest for their company. 
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The study also shows that average corporate managers have higher education 
than average stockholders. As found in the study that none of the managers are 
undergraduate, whereas, 24% of the stockholders are in this level of education. 
Also it is worth noting that majority of the managers (56%) hold postgraduate 
degree in comparison to only 32% of the stockholders. The study also shows 
male domination both in management positions and stockholding of the 
corporations. It is found that statistically both the groups belong to same average 
age level (35 years for managers vs. 33 years for stockholders). But it can be 
noted that the age distribution of managers are symmetrical, whereas the age 
distribution of stockholders are more skewed to the right. This indicates that the 
stockholders enters into the share market at an early age and gradually move into 
some other business.  
 
To compare the governance related attitudinal differences between the managers 
and stockholders, it has been found that the managers and the stockholders 
posses different attitude in general, which is strongly supported by discriminant 
analysis. Manager strongly believes that the governance of their companies is 
quite good. On the contrary, the stockholders view it to be very poor. In terms of 
turnover, production, capital, leverage, debt service, credit policy, solvency, 
human resource, recruitment, technology, satisfaction, internal control, strength, 
opportunity, competition, position, CBA and remedies, the managers and 
stockholders attitude differ significantly. But they agree on issues like R&D, 
weakness, threat, plan and political influence. 
 
The study shows that the managers and stockholders differ for adequacy of 
retained earnings and distribution of these retained earnings as dividend. A 
manager thinks that the company does not have enough retained earnings and 
these should not be distributed among stockholders, whereas a stockholder thinks 
in the opposite direction. But alternative uses of retained earnings other than 
dividend have got the similar type of opinion. Both the groups proposed to use 
the fund for expansion, modernization and prospective investment. Regarding 
dividend income, which is more controllable by the company than capital gain, 
the study shows that the stockholders are in favor of having more of it. This is 
possibly because of manager's desire of consistent dividend growth where 
stockholder wants more dividend than previously received.  
 
The study shows that the managers always think that they are underpaid, but the 
stockholders express the reverse view. Interestingly, the managers do not want to 
change the payment structure, even if, they think they are underpaid; but 
stockholders want the change in salary structure for consistency and fair 
payment. The study finds that company's decisions are believed to be dominated 
by both managers and stockholders. Regarding dominancy, each group believes 
that it is the other group that dominates the decision making. To ensure good 
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governance, both the groups want to have useful mutual interaction but 
stockholders want to interact more than managers. This indicates stockholders 
intention to work and involve more in corporate decision-making.  
 
As noted that the managers and stockholders mostly differ in their attitudes 
regarding different good governance parameters. It is also found that the 
differing attitudes observed between the managers and stockholders regarding 
good governance are quite strong and each group is not very dispersed in their 
stronghold. Hence it can be concluded that unless measures are taken to reduce 
the gap of the managers and stockholders attitudes regarding good governance 
the smooth functioning of the corporations will be difficult. What is needed is 
openness, more dialogues, mutual trust, fair reporting, etc.  
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1  Corporate Manager: An individual related to corporate management and controlling 
affairs for more than two years at a time. 
 
2 Corporate Stockholder: An individual stockholder of corporation for more than one 
year altogether at different time. 
 
3  Corporation: A public limited company (PLC) enlisted in both Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) at January, 2003. 
 
4   Member Register: The register of the members (stockholders) containing their names, 
addresses, etc., and it is mandatory for every PLC to keep such register. 
  
5   Numerical Scale: Numerical scale has numbers as response options, rather than 
semantic space or verbal descriptions, to identify categories (response position). 
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